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Abstract 
This study examines the effect of competition in the product and labour markets on real earnings 
management (REM). REM is accomplished by firms changing investing or operating decisions 
primarily to increase current period earnings and can affect future cash flows negatively. Using 
data from Standard and Poor’s 1500 index firms from 1992 to 2015, I find strong support for the 
prediction that managers in more competitive labour markets are more inclined to use REM 
activities. However, I find little evidence that firms in more competitive product markets will 
reduce their engagement in REM activities. The results from the interaction of these two markets 
show that managers are more inclined to use REM activities whenever they face high labour 
market competition. This suggests that managers’ primary concern as they make REM decisions 
is the impact on their career.  
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1. Introduction  
Stakeholders have expressed concern about managers concentrating more on short-term 
interests to the detriment of long-run firm value. For example, at a symposium in 2003, William 
Donaldson, then U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman in his address 
entreated business leaders and managers to focus on managing the firm for “long-term results”. 
One of the mechanisms which managers could employ to destroy long-term firm value is 
manipulating earnings with real activities. Real earnings management (REM) occurs when 
managers attempt to manipulate earnings through altering the timing, or structuring, of operating 
or investment decisions to boost current period earnings (Gunny 2010; Zang 2012).Though there 
are many types of earnings management, this study identifies the two main types: accruals 
management and earnings management through real activities.  
I focus on REM for two reasons. First, it is more costly to long-term firm value because it 
may affect future cash flow negatively (Roychowdhury 2006; Laksmana and Yang 2014). Not 
only does REM have costs for the firm and shareholders, it also has negative implications for the 
economy due to managers foregoing necessary investments and projects which would benefit the 
firm and economy in the long run. Second, after the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 (hereafter, SOX) REM has become more popular relative to accruals management 
because REM is perceived as being less costly for managers because auditor scrutiny of accruals 
management has improved after enactment of SOX (Cohen et al. 2008). For example, the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was instituted by SOX to regulate the 
activities of accounting firms providing audit services to public companies. Also, SOX mandates 
managers to certify reported financial statements, thus increasing the litigation risk of firms 
employing accruals management. After SOX, managers are still able to make REM decisions 
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without auditors’ approval which makes it very difficult for auditors to detect (Cohen et al. 2008; 
Cohen and Zarowin 2010).  
Despite the high cost of REM to firms (Roychowdury 2006; Laksmana and Yang 2014), 
little research has examined what factors mitigate its negative effect on shareholder value. The 
capital markets may not be effective in mitigating REM because there is a reward for firms that 
meet earnings expectations and punishment for those that do not (Barth, Elliot and Finn 1999; 
Skinner and Sloan 2002). Therefore managers will be inclined to manipulate earnings, especially 
through REM in order to meet the earnings expectations of the capital market. In addition, prior 
literature (Cohen et al. 2008; Bartov and Cohen 2009) provides evidence that REM has become 
more prevalent after the enactment of SOX, suggesting that financial regulation introduced to 
curb accruals management appear to exacerbate REM.   
Product market competition (PMC) is one mechanism that can help to mitigate managers’ 
myopic behaviour, including REM, and promote the focus on long-run firm value. Conversely, 
labour market competition (LMC) in the form of higher CEO turnover, or increased threat of 
dismissal may result in greater REM because of manager career concerns. Ali and Zhang (2015) 
show that CEOs in their early years, who face dismissal threats because the market is uncertain 
about their managerial ability have greater motivation to manipulate earnings. Their paper 
focuses on earnings management through discretionary accruals but they also examine one REM 
activity, decreasing discretionary expenditure as well. Given that managers are faced with both 
kinds of competition, I examine whether and how the interaction of the product and labour 
markets influence REM. 
In this study, I use data from S&P 1500 index firms from 1992 to 2015. First, I examine 
product market competition and REM. I find little to no evidence that managers in highly 
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competitive markets will reduce their engagement in REM activities. Then, I examine the 
relation between labour market competition and REM. I find strong empirical evidence that 
managers in more competitive labour markets increase REM activities. The results suggest that 
managers are more inclined to overproduce more goods than needed and reduce discretionary 
expenditure to increase current period earnings. Finally, I analyse the relation between the 
interaction of these two markets and REM activities. My results indicate that managers are more 
concerned about their career security and thus, more likely to use REM activities whenever they 
are in a competitive labour market.  Even in low product market competition, I still find evidence 
that managers in more competitive labour markets will engage in REM activities to boost 
earnings.  
My study contributes to the literature on REM activities which have increased after SOX, 
and which may have severe negative consequences for firms. Specifically, I extend Laksmana 
and Yang (2014) who examine the effect of competition on both accruals management and 
REM. Unlike their paper, this study examines both product and labour market competition to 
determine their individual and interaction effects on REM activities. Also, while Laksmana and 
Yang (2014) use a sample of all U.S. firms in unregulated industries from 1988 to 2007, this 
study uses data from S&P 1500 index firms from 1992 to 2015. Thus, this study is able to better 
capture managers’ use of REM activities which has gained more prominence after 2002. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews prior literature and 
develops hypotheses on the relation between REM and competition from the product and labour 
markets. Section 3 describes the methodology used for the study: sample selection procedure, 
description of the REM and competition measures and model development. Section 4 reports the 
test results and Section 5 presents the conclusion and implications. 
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2. Literature Review And Hypotheses Development 
2.1. Real Earnings Management 
Roychowdhury (2006) defines real earnings management (REM) as “departures from 
normal operational practices, motivated by managers’ desire to mislead at least some 
stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course 
of operations.” Thus, if managers alter certain operating decisions in an attempt to meet an 
earnings benchmark, it can be considered as real earnings management (Roychowdhury 2006). 
Although these deviations help managers to meet reporting goals, they may not fundamentally 
add to firm value. Examples of the real activities that managers might undertake to manipulate 
earnings include reducing discretionary research and development (R&D) expense, decreasing 
discretionary selling, general and administration (SG&A) expense and overproduction with the 
purpose of reducing cost of goods sold (COGS) (Roychowdhury 2006; Gunny 2010). 1Although 
REM may decrease firm and investor value, it is still a legal practice and is not a breach of 
financial reporting regulations. Even if found out, it would not lead to financial fraud charges or 
earnings restatements (Carcello et al. 2006).  
REM can affect firm value negatively because decisions to manipulate current period 
earnings may affect future cash flows negatively (Laksmana and Yang 2014). Managers may 
engage in real earnings management for different reasons. Roychowdury (2006) and Gunny 
(2010) show that managers use REM strategies to prevent recording losses and meet earnings 
targets. Managers also practice REM to maintain positive earnings numbers (Baber et al. 1991; 
Bartov 1993) and increase their equity-based compensation (Bens et al. 2002). Moreover, 
                                                          
1 According to Gunny (2010), REM occurs when managers try to manipulate recorded current earnings through 
operating decisions that are not in line with the normal business practice. Zang (2012) also describes real earnings 
management (REM) as managers’ deliberate attempts to change reported earnings which is accomplished through 
altering the timing or structure of financial transactions with the goal to meet financial reporting objectives.  
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managers may use REM to improve their integrity and reputation with stakeholders (Bartov et al. 
2002; Gunny 2010).    
Previous studies show the significance of REM in both prevalence and magnitude. 
Graham et al. (2005) who interview financial executives report that a majority of the executives 
expressed a disposition to manipulate earnings by decreasing discretionary expenditure to meet 
financial reporting targets. Specifically, their study documents that 80% of the surveyed 
executives admitted that they would reduce R&D and advertising expenditure, while 55% 
reported that they would suspend implementing a fresh project in an effort to achieve an earnings 
benchmark. A recent stream of literature has documented that the use of REM by firms has 
become more prevalent after the passage of SOX. This is likely a result of the improved scrutiny 
of accruals management and increased penalties imposed by SOX (Bartov and Cohen 2009; 
Cohen et al. 2008; Graham et al. 2005).  
However, researchers have not reached a consensus on the effects of REM on subsequent 
firm performance. Bhojraj et al. (2009) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) show that engaging in 
REM has an adverse effect on firms’ future earnings and operating performance. Bhoraj et al. 
(2009) demonstrate that firms which employ REM activities to meet analysts’ expectations 
experience relatively worse performance in the capital market for the subsequent three years 
compared to their peers. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) argue that even though REM may have less 
administrative costs because it is hard to detect, the future costs to firm value are higher than 
using accrual management techniques. On the contrary, Gunny (2010) provides evidence that 
there is improved future firm value for companies engaging in REM. She points out that meeting 
earnings benchmarks by engaging in REM enables firms to maintain or improve their credibility 
with stakeholders such as suppliers. Also, managers meeting earnings targets by undertaking 
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REM are able to signal future growth prospects. Interestingly, Taylor and Xu (2010) report no 
association between REM and future operating performance for firms that use REM activities 
occasionally.  
 
2.2. Product Market Competition 
Product market competition can help to control managerial behaviour (Hart 1983; Meyer 
& Vickers 1997) and promote managers’ focus on long-run firm value because managers of 
firms in competitive industries feel immense market pressure to act efficiently and minimize the 
risk of bankruptcy (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).Therefore, product market competition helps to 
align managers and investors interests in concentrating on long-term firm value (Guadalupe & 
Perez-Gonzalez 2010; Giroud & Mueller 2010) and restraining managers from making decisions 
that will hurt their firms’ interests as firms contest for market shares in the industry (Dhaliwal et 
al. 2014). In view of this, Laksmana and Yang (2014) show empirically that firms in industries 
with greater product market competition are less inclined to manipulate earnings through both 
discretionary accruals and REM. Of significance to this study is their result on how effective 
product market competition can be in mitigating REM. Laksmana and Yang (2014) find that 
firms which operate in industries with greater product market competition are less inclined to 
employ three forms of REM activities: accelerating the timing of sales, overproducing more 
goods than necessary and reducing discretionary expenditures to boost current period earnings. 
They attribute this finding to the notion that product market competition is a control mechanism 
that discourages earnings manipulation and ensures that managers focus on investors’ interests. 
They also examine whether firms in high or low competition industries use REM activities to 
meet important earnings targets and find that firms in less competitive product markets are more 
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inclined to employ REM strategies to meet earnings targets than their counterparts. Thus, an 
alternative explanation they give for their results is that, firms in less competitive product 
markets are more severely punished by the market if they miss important earnings targets such as 
analysts’ forecasts. Unlike their paper, this study segments competition into product and labour 
markets to see how they individually influence REM activities. I also examine the interaction 
effects of competition from these two markets on the various REM activities. 
In a recent study, Liao and Lin (2016) also examine whether product market competition 
can help to control firms’ tendency to use both accruals management and REM strategies around 
firms’ share repurchase announcements and find results similar to Laksmana and Yang (2014). 
Using data from U.S. firms that declare share repurchase programs from 1990 to 2007, Liao and 
Lin (2016) show that repurchasing firms in highly competitive industries are less inclined to use 
both earnings management strategies. They also attribute their findings to the disciplinary role of 
product market competition. More specifically, they document that their findings on the relation 
between product market competition and accruals management is just evident in the pre-SOX 
period. However, their results for REM are evident both before and after the passage of SOX, 
suggesting that managers have increased REM activities relative to accruals management post-
SOX period.    
In addition, product market competition results in enhanced productivity and efficiency 
of firms (Nickell 1996; Griffith 2001). Nickell (1996) finds that an increased number of 
competitors in an industry results in a higher total productivity growth rate because firms in that 
industry strive to find innovative ideas and minimize costs in order to keep a competitive edge. 
Griffith (2001) also lends more support to this view and argues that increases in product market 
competition results in enhanced productivity and growth rates of firms. In line with this, 
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Laksmana and Yang (2014) contend that product market competition can help to decrease 
managers’ disposition to use REM activities because firms in more competitive industries that 
decrease discretionary expenditure such as R&D and advertising could threaten their own 
competitive advantages and long-term value. 
 On the other hand, product market competition can also increase REM. Empirical studies 
document that the capital market rewards firms that report consistent earnings increases and are 
able to meet earnings expectations, and punishes those that do not meet expectations (eg. Barth, 
Elliot and Finn 1999; Skinner and Sloan 2002). In view of this, Markarian and Santalo (2010) 
argue that market rewards for meeting earnings expectations is particularly important in highly 
competitive product markets as firms which present good earnings figures experience an 
increment in market value. Therefore, managers of such firms are more inclined to manipulate 
earnings if analysts and shareholders cannot monitor the firms’ true output in the marketplace. 
Product market competition also increases capital market pressures in the sense that many firms 
in an industry contend for insufficient funds in the market (Balakrishnan & Cohen 2013). Since 
most investors base their decisions on earnings figures of firms, managers of firms in 
competitive industries are more motivated than their counterparts to manipulate earnings in an 
effort to solicit limited funds from investors.   
Notwithstanding this conflicting evidence, I argue that REM is costly to firms in 
competitive product markets. Therefore, I expect REM to be negatively related to product market 
competition leading to my first hypothesis: 
H1: There is a negative association between product market competition and REM 
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2.3. Labour Market Competition 
Competition in the managerial labour market predisposes managers to focus on their 
career concerns to the detriment of firm long-term value. This is because labour market 
competition raises the dismissal threat (Trojanowski and Renneboog 2003) when a large pool of 
suitable replacement CEO candidates is available (Defond and Park 1999). This is likely because 
companies observe their CEOs’ activities more keenly (Karuna 2007) in an industry where there 
are available CEO replacement candidates. In such industries, termination of managers is more 
likely to be a result of poor performance (Conyon and Florou 2002). Thus, managers who want 
to keep their reputation in the labour market have incentives to make decisions that improve their 
short-run performance to the detriment of long-term shareholder value (Narayanan 1985). In 
support of this, Ali and Zhang (2015) show that CEOs in their early years, who face dismissal 
threats because the market is uncertain about their managerial ability are more inclined to use 
accruals management and REM. Their study focuses on one REM strategy, decreasing 
discretionary expense such as R&D and advertising. They find that CEOs in their early years are 
more inclined to decrease discretionary expenditure in an attempt to increase current period 
earnings. They suggest that these CEOs have greater motivation to manage earnings because 
they want to influence the market’s impression of managerial ability to secure their careers. I 
extend their study by employing all three proxies for REM as developed by Roychowdhury 
(2006) in my analysis. 
Contrary to Ali and Zhang (2015), Demers and Wang (2010) argue that because 
managers want to maximize their lifetime compensation, younger CEOs have little motivation to 
engage in both accruals management and REM activities. Their study claims that younger 
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managers are less inclined to manipulate earnings since these managers will be penalized in later 
years as accruals reverse or REM result in firm value decline. They argue that older managers 
have greater tendency to manipulate earnings because the accruals reversal or firm value decline 
will be detected after they are retired, and thus will not be penalized for earnings management. 
Thus, younger managers are less inclined to use REM strategies. Unlike Demers and Wang 
(2010) who use executives’ age to predict REM use, I use labour market competition as a 
predictor of REM. I develop a comprehensive proxy, AVGTENURE that is the average number 
of years CEOs in an industry typically remain in office before replacement to measure 
competition in the labour market.      
Notwithstanding the conflicting evidence regarding younger CEOs to reduce REM, I 
argue that managers generally in competitive labour markets are more keen about their career 
and may be more inclined to engage in REM. Therefore, I expect more real earnings 
management from managers in competitive labour markets, leading to my second hypothesis: 
H2: There is a positive association between labour market competition and REM 
 
H1 and H2 focus on competition from the product and labour markets separately but 
managers face competition from both markets simultaneously. The remaining hypotheses 
consider the interaction of competition from both markets. First, the level of competition from 
both markets could give managers the same incentives to either increase or decrease REM 
activities, leading to these hypotheses:  
H3a: There is a negative association with REM for firms that face high product market 
competition and low labour market competition 
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H3b: There is a positive association with REM for firms that face low product market 
competition and high labour market competition 
The final hypothesis examines when competition from these two markets present 
managers with conflicting incentives regarding REM activities. In a highly competitive product 
market, managers are expected to focus on firm long-term value. However managers in 
competitive labour markets are not motivated to exert effort when rewards will not be realized 
before their contract ends (Uribe and Xu 2016). On the other hand, managers with less labour 
market concerns are motivated to exert effort because rewards will be achieved before their 
contract ends. Thus, I argue that when managers are in a situation where they have to choose 
between concentrating on the firm long-term value and protecting their career interests, they 
would consider their career concerns primarily. Therefore, I expect these managers to be more 
inclined to use REM activities.       
H4: There is a positive association with REM for firms that face high labour market competition 
and high product market competition 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Real Earnings Management Measures 
Following Roychowdhury(2006), I construct my proxies for REM activities using the 
abnormal cash flow levels, discretionary expenses and production. First, managers can try to 
manipulate sales figures for the current period in order to boost reported earnings. They can do 
this by offering ‘short-time’ price discounts or providing more attractive credit policies, to 
briefly drive up sales in the current period. These ‘short-time’ price discounts or credit policies 
which are usually provided at year end attempt to shift sales from the subsequent fiscal year into 
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the present period. The increased sales figures are unlikely to be sustainable as the firm returns to 
the initial prices. Assuming positive margins, the extra sales will raise reported earnings in that 
fiscal year. However, the price discounts and attractive credit policies will lead to a decline in 
cash inflow for the current period. Thus, a negative, abnormal residual from the following cash 
flow model indicates REM activity.    
 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0+𝛼1(
1
𝐴𝑡−1
)+𝛽1(
𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2(
∆𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
)+𝜖𝑡 ……………………………………………….(1) 
Where CFO is Cash flow from Operations, A is Total Assets and S is Sales  
In addition, managers may reduce discretionary expenditures to manipulate earnings. 
Discretionary expenditures such as R&D and advertising are required to be expensed as incurred 
because their future benefits are not certain. Thus, managers can decrease discretionary 
expenditure to boost earnings in the current period particularly if such expenses will not yield 
instant income. If such expenditures are generally paid in cash, it can result in higher cash flow 
for the current period to the detriment of future cash flows. Thus, a negative, abnormal residual 
from the following discretionary expenditure model also indicates REM activity.  
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0+𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
) +𝛽1 (
𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝜖𝑡     ………………………………………………………(2) 
where DISX is discretionary expenses (the sum of research and development expenses, 
advertising expenses, and selling, general and administrative expenses), A and S are as defined 
above. 
Finally, managers can produce more goods than needed in an attempt to boost earnings. 
Cash flow from Operations will be lower given sales levels because the firm will still have 
production and inventory costs on the items not sold in the current year. Hence, a positive, 
abnormal residual from the following production model is also an indication of REM activity. 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0+𝛼1(
1
𝐴𝑡−1
)+𝛽1(
𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2(
∆𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3(
∆𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝜖𝑡  ……………………………..….(3) 
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where PROD is production cost (the sum of cost of goods sold and change in inventory).                   
Since negative abnormal cash flow and discretionary expenditures levels and a positive abnormal 
production level indicates REM activity, I multiply the residuals from both the cash flow and 
discretionary expense models by -1 to ensure that all REM activities are in the same direction. I 
then use the residuals from the individual REM models to create one REM proxy.                                           
 
3.2. Product Market Competition Measures 
I use the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) as the first proxy of the level of product 
market competition. The HHI measures the level of concentration in an industry and thus is 
inversely related to market competition. The index is computed as the sum of squares of market 
shares of the firms operating in each industry (based on four-digit SIC classification) as shown in 
the following equation.  
HHI = ∑N si2   …………………………………………………………………………………(4) 
          i=1       
I calculate a firm’s market share as the firm’s sales relative to the total net sales of all firms in the 
industry. The index ranges from almost zero (many small firms) to one (a monopoly). Since HHI 
is negatively related to market competition, a high index value is indicative of a less competitive 
industry where the market share is concentrated among a few firms whilst a low value means 
many firms compete for market shares in the industry. Therefore, I multiply HHI by -1 so that 
the HHI variable is now positively related to product market competition.   
My second proxy of product market competition is product substitutability. Following Karuna 
(2007) and Li (2010), I use the Price-cost margin (INDMGN) to determine the extent of product 
substitutability in the market. The Price-cost margin signifies the operating costs a firm incurs to 
generate sales and is computed as aggregate sales of firms in an industry divided by aggregate 
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operating costs of firms in an industry. Similar to the HHI variable, the INDMGN variable is also 
inversely related to product market competition such that a high value indicates a less 
competitive industry where there are no close substitutes for the products and a low value 
signifies a more competitive industry with available product substitutes. Therefore, I also 
multiply INDMGN by -1 so that it is now positively related to product market competition. 
I use both measures (HHI and INDMGN) to create a factor score as my third competition 
measure. The factor score (REMFCT) is created with principal component analysis of the 
residuals of the individual product market competition measures using varimax rotation method. 
 
3.3. Labour Market Competition Measures 
I use the average CEO tenure (AVGTENURE) in an industry to measure the level of 
competition in the labour market. I calculate the AVGTENURE as the average of the number of 
years (tenure) that CEOs stay in office in each industry (based on a four-digit SIC classification). 
The AVGTENURE is also inversely related to labour market competition such that a high number 
indicates a less competitive labour market where CEOs spend longer years in office before they 
are replaced. Similar to the HHI variable, I multiply AVGTENURE by -1 so that the 
AVGTENURE variable is now positively related to labour market competition. 
 
3.4. Sample  
The sample selected for this study is made up of firms that constitute the S&P 1500 index 
from 1992 to 2015. Annual company financial data used for the study will be obtained from the 
COMPUSTAT database and data on CEO tenure obtained from Execucomp. The sample is 
limited to post-1991 data because CEO tenure data is not available on Execucomp before 1992. I 
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start with 24,370 firm-years with 1,497 firms and delete 465 firms (7,103 firm-year observations) 
in regulated industries (SIC codes 4000 – 4999) and financial industries (SIC codes 6000 – 6999) 
because managers in such industries may have different incentives to manage earnings because 
of additional regulation (Burgstahler and Eames 2003). The sample consists of 1,032 firms or 
17,267 firm-years for Hypothesis 1. The sample is finally reduced to 16,575 firm-year 
observations due to missing data from Execucomp required to calculate CEO tenure and the 
product and labour market interaction variable, COMPINT for Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4.  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
3.5. Model 
The first hypothesis states that there is a negative association between product market 
competition and REM. To test this hypothesis, I run the following regression modified from 
Laksmana and Yang (2014): 
REMi,t = β0 + β1HHIi,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3MTBi,t + β4ROAi,t + β5LEVERAGEi,t  β6SOXi,t + β7AMi,t  
+ β8BIG8i,t + β9LITIGATIONi,t + εi,t  …………..(5) 
Where 
REM is defined as one of the real earnings management measurement proxies defined above and 
also the factor score created from the individual REM variables. To get the REM factor score 
(REMFCT), I conduct principal component analysis using varimax rotation method on the 
residuals of the individual REM variables. HHI is a product market competition proxy and the 
main variable of interest to test the first hypothesis. A statistically significant and negative 
coefficient estimate of HHI is an indication that product market competition has a negative 
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relation to REM activities, as I predict. Following prior research, I control for factors that could 
influence REM activities. Cohen et al. (2008) provide evidence that REM activities became more 
prevalent after SOX was enacted in 2002. To control for this change in regulation, following 
Cohen et al. (2008), I include SOX, an indicator variable that equals 1 for fiscal years 2003 
upward and 0 otherwise. Thus, I expect SOX to be positively related to REM activities. Also, 
following Cohen et al. (2008), I include TIME, defined as difference between fiscal year and 
1992, to determine the impact of normal time trend. Following previous research (Laksmana and 
Yang 2014), I also include firm characteristics that might be related to REM. Firm size, proxied 
by SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Growth, proxied by 
MTB is measured as the market to book ratio. A measure of firm performance, ROA, is defined 
as the return on assets. I control for SIZE, MTB and ROA because the REM estimation models do 
not sufficiently capture the impact of size, performance or growth of firms. I do not have 
predictions for these variables. Zang (2012) documents that managers employ accrual 
management (AM) and REM as substitutes. To control for the effect of accruals management, I 
follow Zang (2012) and include AM as a proxy for accruals-based earnings management 
measured with nondiscretionary accruals developed from the modified Jones model (Dechow et 
al. 1995).2 Therefore, I expect AM to be negatively related to REM since managers use them as 
substitutes. Following Laksmana and Yang (2014), I include BIG8 to control for effect of BIG8 
audit firms since these auditors increase the rate at which accruals management can be detected. 
                                                          
2 The equation for estimating Accruals is as follows: 
TAi,t         =  β0           1                +  β1  (ΔREVi,t – ΔRECi,t)    + β2       PPEi,t          …..(2) 
ASSETi,t-1           ASSETi,t-1                                ASSETi,t-1                                    ASSETi,t-1 
 Where  
Total Accruals (TA) is difference between income before extraordinary items and operating cash flows.  
Change in net revenues (ΔREV) is the revenues in year t minus year t-1.  
PPE is the gross value of Property, Plant and Equipment   
Asset is Total Assets. 
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BIG8 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms audited by a big 8 audit firm and 0 otherwise. I 
expect BIG8 to have a positive sign because BIG8 auditors may not detect REM.  Cheng and 
Warfield (2005) argue that the propensity for firms to manage earnings increases with their 
litigation risk. To control for firms’ litigation risk, I follow Cheng and Warfield (2005) and 
include an industry-based litigation dummy variable (LITIGATION) which is equal to 1 for firms 
in highly litigious industries, namely,-pharmaceutical/biotechnology (SIC codes 2833–2836, 
8731–8734), computer (3570–3577, 7370–7374), electronics (3600–3674), or retail (5200–
5961), and 0 otherwise. I expect LITIGATION to be negatively related to REM.  Following 
(Ettredge et al. 2010), I include LEVERAGE, a measure of firm financial distress, defined as 
long-term debt of a firm divided by total assets. Managers of firms in poor financial condition 
are more predisposed to use accruals management (Ettredge et al. 2010). Thus, I argue that firms 
in bad financial condition will be more inclined to use REM activities. Therefore, I expect the 
sign to be positive. 
The second hypothesis predicts that there is a positive relationship between labour market 
competition and REM activities. To test this hypothesis, I run the following regression with the 
AVGTENURE variable: 
REMi,t = β0 + β1AVGTENUREi,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3MTBi,t + β4ROAi,t + β5LEVERAGEi,t  β6SOXi,t 
+ β7AMi,t  + β8BIG8i,t + β9LITIGATIONi,t + εi,t  …………..(6) 
Where AVGTENURE is defined as the average tenure of CEOs in an industry. Similar to the 
HHI variable, my proxy for labour market competition AVGTENURE is now positively related to 
labour market competition since it is multiplied by -1. Thus, a statistically significant and 
positive coefficient estimate of AVGTENURE signifies that labour market competition is 
positively related to REM activities. All other variables are as described as above. 
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The third and fourth hypotheses look at the association between the interaction of the 
product and labour market competition variables and the REM variables. To test these 
interactions, I create an interaction variable COMPINT, which will be the main variable of 
interest used to test the interaction hypotheses H3a, H3b and H4. I use the medians of the HHI 
and AVGTENURE variables which are -0.416 and -10.553 respectively to create these 
interactions. Industries with HHI value greater than the median (-0.416) are classified as high 
product market competition and industries with HHI value less than the median are classified as 
low product market competition. Similarly, industries with AVGTENURE greater than the 
median (-10.553) are classified as high labour market competition and industries with 
AVGTENURE less than the median are classified as low labour market competition. Thus, the 
COMPINT variable has four different sectors that show the various interactions between product 
market competition and labour market competition. The first sector COMPINT1 which tests H3a 
looks at a situation where product market competition is high (high HHI) and labour market 
competition is low (low AVGTENURE). The second sector COMPINT2 tests H3b and examines 
a market with low product market competition (low HHI) and high labour market competition 
(high AVGTENURE). The third sector COMPINT3 looks at a market where product market 
competition is high (high HHI) but labour market competition is also high (high AVGTENURE). 
Thus, COMPINT3 will be the main variable to test H4. Finally, COMPINT4 examines a situation 
where there is low product market competition (low HHI) and low labour market competition 
(low AVGTENURE). Due to model over specification error, I omit COMPINT4 from the 
regression and run equation (7) as follows: 
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REMi,t = β0 + β1COMPINT1i,t  + β2COMPINT2i,t + β3COMPINT3i,t + β4SIZEi,t + β5MTBi,t + 
β6ROAi,t + β7LEVERAGEi,t  + β8SOXi,t + β9AMi,t  + β10BIG8i,t + β11LITIGATIONi,t + εi,t  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………...(7) 
All variables are as defined above. Consistent with H3a, I predict a negative coefficient for 
COMPINT1 and consistent with H3b and H4, I predict positive coefficients for both COMPINT2 
and COMPINT3.   
 
3.6 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2, Panel A provides the summary statistics for the 17,267 firm-year observations. The 
mean (median) residual from the cash flow model is -0.000 (-0.002) while the mean (median) 
residual from the discretionary expense and production models are 0.001 (0.043) and 0.001 
(0.013) respectively. The medians of the HHI and AVGTENURE variables are -0.416 and -
10.553 respectively. The mean of the BIG8 variable is 0.939 indicating that most of the firms in 
the sample employ the services of Big 8 audit firms. The average return on assets is 6.0% while 
the average leverage ratio is 17.3%.  
Table 2, Panel B partitions the sample by median HHI. From Panel B, the means of most of the 
variables used are statistically different between the two groups. I find that firms in industries 
with less competition have more REM activities. This provides initial support for H1. These 
firms are smaller, have more financial distress, less growth opportunities and operate in less 
litigation industries. 
Table 2, Panel C partitions the sample by AVGTENURE. From Panel C, the differences in 
means of most of the variables are statistically significant. I find that managers in industries with 
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high labour market competition engage in more REM activities. These are bigger firms that have 
more growth opportunities and operate in highly litigious industries.  
Table 2, Panel D lists the distribution of the 17,267 total observations by industry (based on two-
digit SIC classification). From the table, the Business Services industry (SIC Code 73) has the 
most number of observations of 2,044 accounting for about 11.84% of the total sample. This is 
closely followed by the Chemical and Allied Products industry (SIC code 28) which has 1,620 
observations constituting about 9.38% of the total sample. The Agricultural Production - 
Livestock industry (SIC code 02) has the least number of observations with just 9 observations 
of the total sample. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
3.7 Correlation Analysis 
Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients between the various variables used for the study. 
From the table, HHI is negatively correlated with AVGTENURE and LEVERAGE implying that 
high product market competition is related with lower labour market competition and lower 
financial distress. However, HHI has a positive correlation with MTB, ROA and LITIGATION 
suggesting that firms in high product market competition have higher growth, more profitability 
and higher litigation risk. For the AVGTENURE variable, I find that it is positively correlated 
with SIZE, LEVERAGE and LITIGATION. This suggests that high labour market competition 
is associated with firms that are bigger, have more financial distress, and operate in industries 
with higher litigation risk.  
Insert Table 3 here 
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4. Results 
4.1. Main Results 
The first hypothesis is tested with Equation 5. Table 4 reports the results of REM 
regressions on HHI with the control variables discussed above. I predict a negative relation 
between the HHI variable and the various REM activities. Model 1 examines product market 
competition and REM through temporarily increasing sales. The coefficient of HHI is negative (-
0.026) and statistically significant (at the 1% level, t=-9.75) implying that highly competitive 
firms have less tendency to drive up current period sales by offering short-time price discounts or 
attractive credit policies. However, in Models 2 and 3, the coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. These results imply that firms in 
industries with high competition are more inclined to decrease discretionary expenditure to 
increase earnings and more inclined to overproduce more goods than necessary to manipulate 
earnings. Model 4 also shows a statistically significant (t= 4.99) and positive HHI coefficient 
(0.139) indicating that firms in industries with high competition more inclined to employ all 
three types of REM activities. Overall the results from Table 4 are mixed, but do not provide 
much support for my first hypothesis. Unlike Laksmana and Yang (2014) who use all U.S firms 
on Compustat to examine the impact of product market competition on REM, this study uses 
data from S&P 1500 index firms which are high performing firms in very competitive markets. 
Thus, a possible explanation for these results is that, in highly competitive product markets, 
firms are more inclined to employ REM activities to signal better performance since the capital 
market rewards firms that are able to meet expectations (Skinner and Sloan 2002).  For my 
control variables, as expected, SOX is positively related to REM activities consistent with the 
prior research that show that managers’ use of REM activities has increased after the enactment 
of SOX (Cohen et al. 2008; Bartov and Cohen 2009). Also, LITIGATION is statistically 
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significant (at the 1% level) and negative in all models implying that highly litigious firms are 
more inclined to use REM activities. Contrary to my expectation, AM is positively related to 
REM activities suggesting that managers actually use accruals management and REM activities 
concurrently. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Table 5 reports the regression results that analyze the relation between competition in the 
labour market and REM activities. I predict a positive relation between labour market 
competition variable and the various REM activities. In Model 1, AVGTENURE has a negative 
(0.000) and statistically significant coefficient (at the 5% level, t=-2.28) indicating that managers 
in highly competitive labour market are less inclined to boost earnings through short-time price 
discounts and attractive credit policies. However, in Models 2 and 3, the coefficients of 
AVGTENURE are positive and statistically significant (both at the 1% level) implying that 
managers in more competitive industry tend to decrease discretionary expenditure in an attempt 
to boost earnings. These managers are also more inclined to overproduce goods to manipulate 
current period earnings. This is also true for Model 4 which has a positive (0.009) and statistically 
significant coefficient (at the 1% level, t=4.97) suggesting that managers in highly competitive 
industries are inclined to employ all three forms of REM activities. Overall, these results lend 
support to the second hypothesis. For the control variables, SOX and LEVERAGE are positively 
related to REM activities while LITIGATION is negatively related to REM. All these are 
consistent with expectation. However, AM is positively related to REM activities contrary to my 
expectation.  
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In all my tests, the results from the cash flow model are opposite to that of the other REM 
models. A possible explanation is that, as Roychowdhury (2006) points out, the net effect from 
the cash flow model is ambiguous and it is difficult to predict how REM impacts this construct. 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
Table 6 reports regression results with interactions from product market competition 
(PMC) and labour market competition (LMC). The main variable of interest here is COMPINT 
which has four different sectors. COMPINT1, the major variable to test H3a models a market 
where there is high product market competition (PMC) and low labour market competition 
(LMC). The coefficient of COMPINT1 is negative and statistically significant in Models 1 and 2 
(both at the 1% level). These results suggest strongly that managers in such an environment are 
less inclined to offer limited-time price discounts and reduce discretionary expenditure in an 
attempt to increase earnings. COMPINT1 is also negative and statistically significant (at the 10% 
level) implying that managers in such firms are also less inclined to overproduce goods to boost 
earnings. COMPINT2 examines a scenario where there is low PMC and high LMC and is the 
main variable to test H3b. COMPINT2 has positive and statistically significant coefficients in 
Models 2, 3 and 4 (all at the 1% level) implying that managers in such a situation are more likely 
to reduce discretionary expenditure, overproduce more goods and engage in all REM activities in 
order to increase current period earnings. These results provide strong support for my prediction 
in H3b. The last hypothesis is tested with the interaction variable COMPINT3 and examines a 
situation where there is high product market competition (PMC) but labour market competition 
(LMC) is also high. I predict a positive relation between COMPINT3 and REM. From the 
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results, the coefficient of COMPINT3 in Model 1 is negative (-0.013) and statistically significant 
(at the 1% level, t=-6.34) indicating that managers in a market where there is high PMC and high 
LMC have lower tendency to manipulate earnings through temporarily increasing sales. 
However COMPINT3 has positive and statistically significant coefficients (at the 1% level) in 
both Models 2 and 4 suggesting that managers in a market with high PMC but high LMC are 
more inclined to decrease discretionary expenditures and also more inclined to employ the 
various REM activities combined to boost current period earnings. These results are consistent 
with my prediction for the last hypothesis.  
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
4.2. Robustness Analyses 
I conduct additional analyses to test for the robustness of my results. First, I conduct 
supplementary analyses to test the robustness of my results from the product market competition 
regression. Thus, I run the regression for Equation 5 with the second product market competition 
measure (INDMGN for product substitutability) and the factor score from both product market 
competition variables (PMCFCT). Tables 7 and 8 report the results from these regressions. From 
Table 7, the coefficient of INDMGN is negative but not statistically significant in Model 1. 
However, INDMGN is positive and statistically significant in Models 2, 3 and 4 (all the 1% 
level) indicating that firms in highly competitive product markets are more inclined to decrease 
discretionary expenditure and overproduce extra goods to boost current period earnings. These 
results conform with, and are very similar to the main results with the HHI variable. 
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Insert Table 7 about here 
 
Table 8 presents the results from the product market competition regression with the PMCFCT 
variable. From Table 8, PMCFCT is negative but not statistically significant in Model 1. 
However, the coefficient of PMCFCT is positive and statistically significant in Models 2, 3 and 4 
(all at the 1% level). These results are also quantitatively very similar to the main results with the 
HHI variable. Therefore, the results from the product market competition (PMC) regression are 
robust to the other PMC variable and the factor score from both PMC variables as well.  
    
Insert Table 8 about here 
 
 Next, I replicate the results from Tables 4 and 5 after controlling for industry effects. Tables 9 
and 10 report the regressions for these analyses. Comparing the results in Table 4 and Table 9, 
the results for the product market competition regressions after controlling for industry effects 
are quantitatively similar to the results for the previous section. The significance level of HHI in 
Model 3 is still 5% while all the other models are still significant at 1%. The coefficients for HHI 
remain the same for all four models. Similar to the main results, these results suggest that firms 
in industries with high product market competition have greater tendency to use REM activities.  
 
 Insert Table 9 about here 
 
Comparing the results in Table 5 and Table 10, the results for the labour market competition 
regressions after controlling for industry effects are similar to the main results. The significance 
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level of AVGTENURE in Model 1 is still at 5% with all the other models being still significant 
at 1%. The coefficients for AVGTENURE remain the same for all four models. Just as the main 
results, the results in Table 10 imply that firms in highly competitive labour markets are more 
inclined to use REM activities. Therefore, I believe the results are robust to controlling for 
industry effects. 
 
Insert Table 10 about here 
 
Prior research provides evidence that REM activities have increased after the implementation of 
SOX (Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010). Therefore I conduct supplementary analyses 
to examine the effect of the enactment of SOX on my sample. Table 11 presents results from the 
product market competition regression with SOX interaction variables whilst Table 12 reports 
results from the labour market competition regression with SOX interaction variables. From 
Table 11, SOXHHI has negative and statistically significant coefficients in Models 2 and 4 (both 
at the 1% level) and also a negative and significant coefficient in Model 3 (at the 5% level). 
These results imply that, after the passage of SOX, firms in highly competitive products have 
reduced their tendency to engage in REM by decreasing discretionary expenditure and 
overproducing more goods than necessary to boost earnings. However, from Table 12, there is a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient of SOXAVGTEN in Models 2 and 4 (both at the 
1% level). These results imply that managers in more competitive labour markets are actually 
inclined to increase REM through decreasing discretionary expenditure to boost earnings figures 
after the implementation of SOX, conforming to prior literature.  
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Insert Tables 11 & 12 about here 
 
Advertising could be argued to be an important expense to firms and thus, not 
discretionary. Therefore, I re-run equations 5 and 6 without advertising expense included in the 
Discretionary Expense and REM factor models to determine the robustness of my results. The 
results from these analyses, which are presented in Table 13, are quantitatively very similar to 
the main results. The coefficient of HHI is still positive and statistically significant in both 
Models 2 and 4. The coefficient of HHI in Model 2 is 0.011 (significant at the 5% level) and the 
coefficient in Model 4 is 0.121(significant at the 1% level). Similarly, for the AVGTENURE 
variable, the coefficient is still positive and statistically significant in Model 2 (0.002 significant 
at 1% level) and Model 4 (0.011 significant at 1% level.) Therefore, the results still hold even if 
Advertising Expense is deleted from the Discretionary Expense (Model 2) and the REM Factor 
(Model 4).   
Insert Table 13 about here 
 
5. Conclusion 
REM is more costly to long-term firm value relative to accruals management. However, despite 
the high cost of REM to firm value (Roychowdury 2006; Laksmana and Yang 2014), little 
research has examined what factors can help to control its negative effect. This study examines 
whether competition from the product market can be effective in mitigating REM even with 
labour market competition. Using data from S&P 1500 index firms from 1992 to 2015 available 
from Compustat, I find little evidence that firms in more competitive product markets reduce 
their REM activities. However extending the study of Laksmana and Yang(2014), I provide 
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evidence on whether competition from the labour market has an influence on REM activities. I 
find strong support for the prediction that managers in more competitive labour markets will be 
inclined to increase REM activities relative to their peers. This result implies that managers who 
find themselves in highly competitive labour markets will reduce discretionary expenditures and 
overproduce more goods than necessary to boost current period earnings. This gives support to 
the argument that managers want to secure their jobs and thus will provide more favourable 
earnings figures to stakeholders. I also study the effect of the interaction between competition 
from these two markets (product and labour) on REM. I find that managers give priority to their 
career security and will be induced to use REM activities whenever they face high labour market 
competition.  Even in the presence of low product market competition, I still provide evidence 
that managers in more competitive labour markets will indulge in REM activities to increase 
earnings than their counterparts in less competitive labour markets. These results suggest that 
labour market concerns are of paramount interest to CEOs as they make earnings management 
choices. 
This study is not without limitations. First, the study does not provide analysis for the 
different REM models across different industries. There is the possibility that the impact of 
competition on specific REM activities could be more profound for one industry than the other. 
For instance, firms in the retail and automobile industry could be more inclined to offer limited-
time price discounts and credit policies and firms in the pharmaceutical industry could be more 
inclined to reduce discretionary expenditure relative to the other REM strategies to meet earnings 
targets. Also, the study does not control for corporate governance factors that might influence 
REM activities. For example, a firm where the CEO is chairman of the board of directors could 
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be more inclined to employ REM strategies relative to a firm where the board is independent of 
the CEO. 
This study examines the association between REM and competition from both the 
product and labour markets. Therefore, further research could look at the factors which actually 
cause managers to engage in REM activities. For instance, a change in regulation which can 
introduce shock for a particular industry such as manufacturing, and thus could induce managers 
to employ REM strategies. Also, I use data from S&P 1500 index firms traded on the U.S. stock 
markets, leaving examining REM choices in different countries to see how variations in labour 
market competition affect REM choices for further research. 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection and Composition 
Sample Selection Firms Firm-years 
S&P1500 firms with available data on Compustat 
during 1992-2015 
1,497 24,370 
Less: observations in regulated and financial 
industries (SIC codes 4000-4999 & 6000-6999) 
465 7,103 
Remaining firms 1,032 17,267 
Less: missing data from Execucomp to calculate 
CEO tenure and interaction variable to give Sample 
for H2, H3 and H4 
0 692 
Final Sample 1,032 16,575 
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Table 2 
Univariate Analyses 
Panel A. This table summarizes the descriptive statistics of key variables of the full sample. See 
Appendix 1 for variable definitions. See Table 1 for a description of sample selection.  
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Lower 
Quartile 
Upper 
Quartile 
Kurtosis 
HHI 17,267 -0.490 -0.416 0.269 -0.659 -0.280 -0.675 
AM 17,267 0.000 0.017 0.086 -0.034 0.051 0.686 
SIZE 17,267 7.645 7.483 1.615 6.477 8.676 -0.145 
LEVERAGE 17,267 0.173 0.153 0.155 0.020 0.270 0.3119 
SOX 17,267 0.672 1 0.469 0 1 -1.465 
BIG8 17,267 0.939 1 0.238 1 1 11.719 
MTB 17,267 3.292 2.516 3.943 1.629 4.029 10.395 
ROA 17,267 0.060 0.062 0.085 0.031 0.098 8.473 
LITIGATION 17,267 0.229 0 0.421 0 0 -0.345 
CFO 17,267 -0.000 -0.002 0.092 -0.054 0.051 0.431 
DISEXP 17,267 0.001 0.043 0.214 -0.114 0.134 0.605 
PROD 17,267 0.001 0.013 0.218 -0.104 0.130 1.556 
REMFCT 17,267 0.003 0.131 0.965 -0.487 0.633 0.822 
AVGTENURE 17,052 -11.184 -10.553 4.028 -13.032 -8.556 4.136 
COMPINT 16,575 5.159 4.283 3.534 2.931 6.269 13.151 
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Panel B: Sample Partitioned by HHI. 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of key variables of the full sample partitioned by 
high and low product market competition. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
 
 Low HHI High HHI Difference 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Means t-value 
AM 8,803 0.001 0.019 8,464 -0.001 0.013 -0.002 -1.72 
SIZE 8,803 7.632 7.480 8,464 7.659 7.487 0.027 -7.81*** 
LEVERAGE 8,803 0.182 0.169 8,464 0.164 0.136 -0.018 -14.96*** 
SOX 8,803 0.587 1.000 8,464 0.760 1.000 0.173 52.04*** 
BIG8 8,803 0.939 1.000 8,464 0.940 1.000 0.001 -6.22*** 
MTB 8,803 3.202 2.443 8,464 3.384 2.599 0.182 0.45 
ROA 8,803 0.058 0.059 8,464 0.062 0.065 0.004 -3.6*** 
LITIGATION 8,803 0.166 0 8,464 0.295 0 0.129 17.67*** 
CFO 8,803 0.011 0.007 8,464 -0.011 -0.013 -0.022 -21.46*** 
DISEXP 8,803 0.016 0.058 8,464 -0.017 0.025 -0.033 -13.99*** 
PROD 8,803 0.012 0.027 8,464 -0.012 0.008 -0.024 -9.68*** 
REMFCT 8,803 0.050 0.131 8,464 -0.046 0.131 -0.096 -9.35*** 
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Panel C: Sample Partitioned by AVGTENURE.  
This table presents the descriptive statistics of key variables of the full sample partitioned by 
high and low labour market competition. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
 
 Low AVGTENURE High AVGTENURE Difference 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Means t-value 
AM 8,233 0.006 0.018 8,555 0.008 0.020 0.002 2.33** 
SIZE 8,233 7.652 7.511 8,555 7.661 7.483 0.009 -21.48*** 
LEVERAGE 8,233 0.172 0.151 8,555 0.176 0.157 0.004 2.53** 
SOX 8,233 0.694 1.000 8,555 0.703 1.000 0.009 5.84*** 
BIG8 8,233 0.945 1.000 8,555 0.938 1.000 -0.007 -17.44*** 
MTB 8,233 3.239 2.494 8,555 3.341 2.524 0.102 -1.7 
ROA 8,233 0.062 0.063 8,555 0.059 0.062 -0.003 -3.16*** 
LITIGATION 8,233 0.195 0 8,555 0.262 0 0.067 10.38*** 
CFO 8,233 -0.008 -0.007 8,555 -0.004 -0.005 -0.012 3.33*** 
DISEXP 8,233 -0.022 0.023 8,555 0.008 0.037 0.03 12.32*** 
PROD 8,233 -0.012 0.015 8,555 0.006 0.025 0.018 6.96*** 
REMFCT 8,233 -0.065 0.131 8,555 0.041 0.132 0.106 10.01*** 
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Panel D. Sample Distribution by Industry.  
This table presents the sample classified by industry type(according to two-digit SIC code) 
SIC Code 
(Two-digit) 
Industry N 
01 Agricultural Production – Crops 16 
02 Agricultural Production – Livestock 9 
07 Agricultural Services 15 
10 Metal, Mining 69 
12 Coal Mining 21 
13 Oil & Gas Extraction 864 
14 Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 61 
15 General Building Contractors 225 
16 Heavy Construction, Except Building 156 
17 Special Trade Contractors 52 
20 Food & Kindred Products 703 
21 Tobacco Products 53 
22 Textile Mill Products 106 
23 Apparel & Other Textile Products 196 
24 Lumber & Wood Products 158 
25 Furniture & Fixtures 191 
26 Paper & Allied Products 294 
27 Printing & Publishing 164 
28 Chemical & Allied Products 1620 
29 Petroleum & Coal Products 160 
30 Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics Products 181 
31 Leather & Leather Products 107 
32 Stone, Clay, & Glass Products 97 
33 Primary Metal Industries 378 
34 Fabricated Metal Products 380 
35 Industrial Machinery & Equipment 1369 
36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 1492 
37 Transportation Equipment 727 
38 Instruments & Related Products 1262 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 157 
50 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 493 
51 Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods 253 
52 Building Materials & Gardening Supplies 98 
53 General Merchandise Stores 253 
54 Food Stores 109 
55 Automative Dealers & Service Stations 174 
56 Apparel & Accessory Stores 442 
57 Furniture & Homefurnishings Stores 112 
58 Eating & Drinking Places 448 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 353 
70 Hotels & Other Lodging Places 39 
40 
 
SIC Code 
(Two-digit) 
Industry N 
72 Personal Services 108 
73 Business Services 2044 
75 Auto Repair, Services, & Parking 56 
78 Motion Pictures 51 
79 Amusement & Recreation Services 75 
80 Health Services 366 
82 Educational Services 95 
87 Engineering & Management Services 291 
99 Non-Classifiable Establishments 58 
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Table 3. 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients  
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0  
Number of Observations 
  HHI AVGTENURE AM SIZE LEVERAGE BIG8 MTB ROA LITIGATION CFO DISEXP PROD REMFCT 
HHI 
1.00000 
  
 
 
 
          
AVGTENURE 
-0.181 
<.0001 
 
1.00000 
  
 
 
          
AM 
-0.029 
0.0002 
 
-0.030 
0.0001 
 
1.00000 
  
 
          
SIZE 
0.007 
0.3443 
 
0.025 
0.0016 
 
-0.016 
0.0340 
 
1.0000 
  
 
         
LEVERAGE 
-0.040 
<.0001 
 
0.024 
0.0020 
 
0.015 
0.0561 
 
0.082 
<.0001 
 
1.0000 
  
 
        
BIG8 
-0.006 
0.4387 
 
0.008 
0.3250 
 
0.039 
<.0001 
 
-0.019 
0.0097 
 
0.015 
0.0520 
 
1.00000 
  
 
       
MTB 
0.026 
0.0008 
 
0.010 
0.1827 
 
-0.015 
0.0454 
 
0.327 
<.0001 
 
-0.023 
0.0026 
 
-0.028 
0.0003 
 
1.00000 
  
 
      
ROA 
0.024 
0.0021 
 
-0.013 
0.0860 
 
-0.004 
0.6151 
 
0.229 
<.0001 
 
-0.222 
<.0001 
 
-0.011 
0.1605 
 
0.266 
<.0001 
 
1.0000 
  
 
     
LITIGATION 
0.180 
<.0001 
 
0.030 
0.0001 
 
-0.103 
<.0001 
 
-0.017 
0.0313 
 
-0.053 
<.0001 
 
-0.045 
<.0001 
 
0.002 
0.8189 
 
0.014 
0.0678 
 
1.00000 
  
 
    
CFO 
-0.099 
<.0001 
 
-0.024 
0.0020 
 
0.229 
<.0001 
 
-0.014 
0.0642 
 
0.007 
0.3943 
 
-0.021 
0.0058 
 
-0.004 
0.5855 
 
-0.014 
0.0648 
 
-0.055 
<.0001 
 
1.0000 
  
 
   
DISEXP 
-0.014 
0.0779 
 
0.033 
<.0001 
 
0.079 
<.0001 
 
0.039 
<.0001 
 
0.031 
<.0001 
 
-0.036 
<.0001 
 
-0.000 
0.9818 
 
0.008 
0.3009 
 
-0.229 
<.0001 
 
0.177 
<.0001 
 
1.0000 
  
 
  
PROD 
-0.002 
0.7810 
 
0.015 
0.0529 
 
0.119 
<.0001 
 
0.032 
<.0001 
 
0.012 
0.1206 
 
0.004 
0.5942 
 
0.004 
0.6361 
 
0.004 
0.6070 
 
-0.147 
<.0001 
 
0.467 
<.0001 
 
0.776 
<.0001 
 
1.0000 
  
 
 
REMFCT 
0.009 
0.2542 
 
0.031 
<.0001 
 
0.062 
<.0001 
 
0.042 
<.0001 
 
0.025 
0.0011 
 
-0.018 
0.0177 
 
0.002 
0.7812 
 
0.011 
0.1618 
 
-0.212 
<.0001 
 
0.152 
<.0001 
 
0.968 
<.0001 
 
0.868 
<.0001 
 
1.00000 
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Table 4. 
Product Market Competition Regression with Full Sample (Main Results).  
This table presents estimation results from REM model regressions on Product market competition with HHI 
variable. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. The reported t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, * represent significance 
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Dep. Var. CFO DISEXP PROD REMFCT 
Variable Coef. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.035 6.76*** 0.078 6.60*** 0.016 1.30 0.193 3.59*** 
HHI -0.026 -9.75*** 0.018 3.01*** 0.014 2.14** 0.139 4.99*** 
Accrual 0.133 16.28*** 0.042 2.24** 0.251 12.86*** 0.407 4.76*** 
Size -0.000 -0.77 0.004 3.93*** 0.005 4.28*** 0.022 4.52*** 
Time -0.003 -12.83*** -0.002 -5.00*** -0.001 -1.73* -0.003 -1.56 
Leverage -0.003 -0.57 0.021 1.96** 0.003 0.31 0.073 1.52 
SOX 0.012 4.36*** 0.008 1.31 0.003 0.45 0.005 0.17 
BIG8 -0.017 -5.79*** -0.053 -7.93*** -0.018 -2.55** -0.154 -5.05*** 
MTB 0.000 0.66 -0.0018 -1.92* -0.001 -1.36 -0.004 -1.93* 
ROA -0.015 -1.74* 0.023 1.16 0.007 0.32 0.117 1.28 
Litigation -0.006 -3.32*** -0.116 -30.11*** -0.074 -18.68*** -0.476 -27.25*** 
         
N 17,267  17,267  17,267  17,267  
Adj. R2 0.040  0.057  0.033  0.046  
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Table 5. 
Labour Market Competition Regression with full sample.  
This table reports regression results from equation (6), labour market competition on the REM models. See 
Appendix 1 for variable definitions. The reported t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, * represent significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Dep. Var. CFO DISEXP PROD REMFCT 
Variable Coef. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.026 5.11*** 0.051 4.11*** -0.008 -0.60 0.077 1.36 
AvgTenure -0.000 -2.28** 0.002 5.30*** 0.001 2.68*** 0.009 4.97*** 
Accrual 0.262 30.72*** 0.149 7.29*** 0.263 12.30*** 0.491 5.25*** 
Size -0.001 -1.33 0.005 4.62*** 0.005 4.45*** 0.025 5.12*** 
Time -0.002 -10.33*** -0.001 -2.26** -0.000 -0.15 0.001 0.37 
Leverage 0.000 0.07 0.026 2.40** 0.008 0.68 0.089 1.82* 
SOX 0.015 5.46*** 0.011 1.62 0.003 0.50 0.006 0.19 
BIG8 -0.015 -5.09*** -0.044 -6.34*** -0.006 -0.76 -0.106 -3.33*** 
MTB 0.000 0.33 -0.001 -1.68* -0.000 -0.82 -0.003 -1.46 
ROA -0.009 -1.13 0.027 1.34 0.009 0.41 0.124 1.32 
Litigation -0.007 -4.42*** -0.116 -30.39*** -0.078 -19.57*** -0.482 -27.50*** 
         
N 16,575  16,575  16,575  16,575  
Adj. R2 0.062  0.063  0.036  0.051  
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Table 6. 
 
Product and Labour Market Competition Interaction Regression.  
 
This table summarizes regression results from the REM models and the interaction of product and labour market 
competition. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. The reported t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity 
consistent standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, * represent 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Dep. Var. CFO DISEXP PROD REMFCT 
Variable Coef. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.035 7.29*** 0.022 1.89* -0.024 -1.99** -0.057 -1.08 
CompInt1 -0.017 -8.82*** -0.015 -3.25*** -0.008 -1.67* -0.019 -0.93 
CompInt2 -0.0016 -0.37 0.026 5.68*** 0.024 5.03*** 0.125 5.97*** 
CompInt3 -0.013 -6.34*** 0.029 6.07*** 0.008 1.58 0.129 5.75*** 
Accrual 0.259 30.69*** 0.143 7.09*** 0.263 12.42*** 0.482 5.19*** 
Size -0.001 -1.54 0.005 4.31*** 0.005 4.21*** 0.024 4.85*** 
Time -0.002 -9.27*** -0.001 -2.29** 0.000 0.09 0.001 0.25 
Leverage -0.002 -0.49 0.022 2.06** 0.002 0.17 0.072 1.49 
SOX 0.015 5.70*** 0.011 1.68* 0.004 0.62 0.007 0.24 
BIG8 -0.014 -4.92*** -0.044 -6.51*** -0.007 -1.01 -0.113 -3.59*** 
MTB 0.000 0.70 -0.001 -1.90* -0.000 -1.02 -0.004 -1.76* 
ROA -0.011 -1.29 0.033 1.63 0.009 0.43 0.144 1.54 
Litigation -0.006 -3.41*** -0.121 -30.28*** -0.077 -18.29*** -0.494 -26.97*** 
         
N 16,788  16,788  16,788  16,788  
Adj. R2 0.068  0.069  0.038  0.054  
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Table 7. 
  
Product Market Competition Regression with Full Sample (INDMGN).  
 
This table presents estimation results from REM model regressions on Product market competition with INDMGN 
Variable. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. The reported t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, * represent significance 
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Dep. Var. CFO DISEXP PROD REMFCT 
Variable Coef. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.134 23.39*** 0.235 15.79*** 0.221 15.41*** 0.854 12.68*** 
IndMgn -0.001 -0.35 0.089 8.52*** 0.053 5.28*** 0.369 7.82*** 
Accrual 0.230 31.88*** 0.095 5.10*** 0.459 25.52*** 0.792 9.34*** 
Size -0.014 -33.84*** -0.019 -17.96*** -0.014 -13.69*** -0.054 -11.38*** 
Time -0.000 -1.90* -0.001 -2.09** -0.001 -2.33** -0.004 -2.03** 
Leverage 0.023 5.81*** 0.206 19.87*** 0.122 12.19*** 0.799 17.04*** 
SOX 0.003 1.04 0.011 1.69* 0.014 2.25** 0.055 1.92* 
BIG8 -0.003 -1.16 -0.004 -0.65 -0.008 -1.19 -0.026 -0.86 
MTB -0.001 -8.13*** -0.010 -23.78*** -0.008 -19.58*** -0.043 -22.22*** 
ROA -0.416 -53.53*** -0.019 -0.92 -0.792 -40.87*** -0.857 -9.40*** 
Litigation -0.003 -2.31** 0.005 1.34 -0.000 -0.02 0.023 1.32 
         
N 17,267  17,267  17,267  17,267  
Adj. R2 0.275  0.098  0.199  0.090  
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Table 8. 
 
Product Market Competition Regression with Full Sample (PMCFCT).  
 
This table presents estimation results from REM model regressions on Product market competition with PMCFCT 
Variable. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. The reported t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, * represent significance 
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Dep. Var. CFO DISEXP PROD REMFCT 
Variable Coef. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.136 32.50*** 0.154 14.16*** 0.172 16.51*** 0.516 10.51*** 
PmcFct -0.000 -0.42 0.014 8.63*** 0.009 5.53*** 0.061 8.01*** 
Accrual 0.229 31.82*** 0.095 5.08*** 0.459 25.50*** 0.791 9.33*** 
Size -0.014 -33.83*** -0.019 -17.86*** -0.014 -13.65*** -0.053 -11.29*** 
Time -0.000 -1.90* -0.001 -2.04** -0.001 -2.30** -0.004 -1.99** 
Leverage 0.023 5.78*** 0.205 19.80*** 0.121 12.16*** 0.797 16.98*** 
SOX 0.003 1.04 0.011 1.69* 0.014 2.24** 0.055 1.92* 
BIG8 -0.003 -1.34 -0.008 -1.17 -0.009 -1.51 -0.039 -1.32 
MTB -0.001 -8.18*** -0.010 -23.75*** -0.008 -19.58*** -0.043 -22.20*** 
ROA -0.415 -53.51*** -0.019 -0.98 -0.792 -40.94*** -0.862 -9.46*** 
Litigation -0.003 -2.29** 0.006 1.46 0.000 0.08 0.025 1.44 
         
N 17,267  17,267  17,267  17,267  
Adj. R2 0.275  0.098  0.199  0.090  
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Table 9. 
Product Market Competition Regression with Full Sample (Robustness).  
This table presents estimation results from REM model regressions on Product market competition after controlling 
for industry effects. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. The reported t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity 
consistent standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, * represent 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Dep. Var. CFO DISEXP PROD REMFCT 
Variable Coef. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.035 6.52*** 0.078 6.48*** 0.016 1.27 0.193 3.54*** 
HHI -0.026 -9.84*** 0.018 3.06*** 0.014 2.17** 0.139 5.09*** 
Accrual 0.133 11.63*** 0.042 1.99** 0.251 11.08*** 0.407 4.29*** 
Size -0.000 -0.76 0.004 3.94*** 0.005 4.28*** 0.022 4.54*** 
Time -0.003 -13.16*** -0.002 -5.16*** -0.001 -1.77* -0.003 -1.61 
Leverage -0.003 -0.58 0.021 1.89* 0.003 0.30 0.073 1.47 
SOX 0.012 4.39*** 0.008 1.33 0.003 0.45 0.005 0.17 
BIG8 -0.017 -5.36*** -0.053 -7.90*** -0.018 -2.50** -0.154 -4.96*** 
MTB 0.000 0.65 -0.001 -1.81* -0.001 -1.33 -0.004 -1.83* 
ROA -0.015 -1.72* 0.023 1.07 0.007 0.30 0.117 1.19 
Litigation -0.006 -3.16*** -0.116 -27.86*** -0.074 -17.61*** -0.476 -25.48*** 
         
N 17267  17267  17267  17267  
Adj. R2 0.041  0.058  0.033  0.047  
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Table 10. 
Labour Market Competition Regression with Full Sample (Robustness).  
This table presents estimation results from REM model regressions on Labour market competition after controlling 
for industry effects. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. The reported t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity 
consistent standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, * represent 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Dep. Var. Cash Flow Disc. Expense Production REM Factor 
Variable Coef. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.026 4.86*** 0.051 4.06*** -0.008 -0.59 0.077 1.35 
AvgTenure -0.000 -2.34** 0.002 5.41*** 0.001 2.58*** 0.009 4.82*** 
Accrual 0.262 20.71*** 0.149 6.20*** 0.263 9.97*** 0.491 4.48*** 
Size -0.001 -1.31 0.005 4.60*** 0.005 4.42*** 0.025 5.11*** 
Time -0.002 -10.60*** -0.001 -2.33** -0.000 -0.16 0.001 0.39 
Leverage 0.000 0.07 0.026 2.33** 0.008 0.68 0.089 1.78* 
SOX 0.015 5.55*** 0.011 1.66* 0.003 0.50 0.006 0.20 
BIG8 -0.015 -4.62*** -0.044 -6.29*** -0.006 -0.75 -0.106 -3.26*** 
MTB 0.000 0.33 -0.001 -1.58 -0.000 -0.80 -0.003 -1.39 
ROA -0.009 -1.11 0.027 1.24 0.009 0.38 0.124 1.24 
Litigation -0.007 -4.15*** -0.116 -27.42*** -0.078 -18.03*** -0.482 -24.97*** 
         
N 16575  16575  16575  16575  
Adj. R2 0.062  0.064  0.036  0.051  
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Table 11. 
Product Market Competition Regression with SOX Interaction. 
This table presents estimation results from REM model regressions on Product market competition with SOX 
interaction variables. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. The reported t-statistics are based on 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, 
**, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Dep. Var. CFO DISCEXP PROD REMFCT 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.067 6.41*** 0.114 4.58*** 0.025 0.98 0.256 2.28** 
HHI -0.027 -6.20*** 0.054 5.17*** 0.033 3.09*** 0.294 6.17*** 
Accrual 0.105 8.37*** 0.010 0.35 0.227 7.37*** 0.327 2.42** 
Size -0.002 -2.75*** 0.002 0.89 0.003 1.46 0.013 1.63 
Time -0.008 -20.52*** -0.007 -7.37*** -0.002 -1.75* -0.008 -1.88* 
Leverage -0.002 -0.23 0.011 0.56 -0.025 -1.30 -0.015 -0.18 
SOX -0.056 -4.51*** -0.069 -2.33** -0.022 -0.70 -0.145 -1.08 
BIG8 -0.011 -1.38 -0.019 -1.01 0.011 0.55 -0.006 -0.07 
MTB 0.000 1.41 -0.001 -1.94* -0.001 -1.48 -0.004 -2.12** 
ROA -0.006 -0.38 0.017 0.47 -0.002 -0.05 0.078 0.49 
Litigation 0.001 0.37 -0.132 -19.28*** -0.078 -10.96*** -0.541 -17.29*** 
SOXHHI 0.005 0.87 -0.053 -4.05*** -0.028 -2.10** -0.232 -3.92*** 
SOXAM 0.167 10.05*** 0.151 3.84*** 0.071 1.73* 0.251 1.39 
SOXSIZE 0.002 2.19** 0.004 1.63 0.003 1.35 0.013 1.29 
SOXTIME 0.007 15.21*** 0.006 5.28*** 0.001 0.90 0.006 1.15 
SOXLEV -0.004 -0.38 0.011 0.46 0.041 1.71* 0.121 1.16 
SOXBIG8 0.001 0.17 -0.033 -1.64 -0.031 -1.47 -0.162 -1.77* 
SOXMTB 0.000 0.21 -0.000 -1.81* -0.000 -1.71* -0.000 -1.97** 
SOXROA -0.007 -0.38 0.017 0.39 0.011 0.24 0.059 0.30 
SOXLIT -0.009 -2.64*** 0.022 2.67*** 0.002 0.28 0.083 2.18** 
         
N 16941  16941  16941  16941  
Adj. R2 0.078  0.063  0.035  0.049  
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Table 12. 
Labour Market Competition Regression with SOX Interaction. 
This table presents estimation results from REM model regressions on Labour market competition with SOX 
interaction variables. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. The reported t-statistics are based on 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, 
**, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dep. Var. CFO DISCEXP PROD REMFCT 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.057 5.24*** 0.031 1.14 -0.015 -0.55 -0.059 -0.49 
AvgTenure 0.000 1.13 0.000 0.12 0.000 0.03 -0.001 -0.17 
Accrual 0.310 21.95*** 0.201 5.82*** 0.256 7.08*** 0.536 3.39*** 
Size -0.003 -3.27*** 0.003 1.57 0.003 1.40 0.018 2.11** 
Time -0.006 -13.63*** -0.003 -3.20*** 0.001 0.97 0.003 0.75 
Leverage 0.008 0.94 0.025 1.25 -0.022 -1.07 0.012 0.13 
SOX -0.045 -3.47*** 0.019 0.59 0.008 0.24 0.156 1.08 
BIG8 -0.006 -0.71 -0.014 -0.71 0.008 0.41 -0.005 -0.06 
MTB 0.000 1.18 -0.001 -1.73* -0.000 -1.06 -0.004 -1.74* 
ROA -0.009 -0.61 0.025 0.65 -0.006 -0.14 0.108 0.62 
Litigation 0.002 0.76 -0.131 -18.46*** -0.084 -11.27*** -0.547 -16.84*** 
SOXAVGTEN -0.001 -2.81*** 0.003 3.12*** 0.002 1.63 0.013 3.27*** 
SOXAM -0.015 -0.84 -0.034 -0.79 0.023 0.50 -0.027 -0.14 
SOXSIZE 0.002 2.63*** 0.003 1.38 0.004 1.58 0.012 1.18 
SOXTIME 0.005 9.53*** 0.003 2.30** -0.001 -1.21 -0.004 -0.69 
SOXLEV -0.012 -1.25 -0.003 -0.13 0.040 1.63 0.097 0.90 
SOXBIG8 -0.004 -0.44 -0.027 -1.29 -0.013 -0.60 -0.101 -1.04 
SOXMTB 0.000 0.37 -0.000 -1.83* -0.000 -1.68* -0.000 -1.98** 
SOXROA 0.003 0.16 0.006 0.14 0.016 0.35 0.017 0.08 
SOXLIT -0.012 -3.46*** 0.020 2.40** 0.006 0.67 0.087 2.25** 
         
N 16401  16401  16401  16401  
Adj. R2 0.084  0.066  0.037  0.052  
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Table 13. 
Discretionary Expense and REM Factor Models without Advertising Expense.  
This table presents estimation results from Discretionary Expense and REM Factor models without Advertising 
Expense included in the models. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. The reported t-statistics are based on 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, 
**, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 Model (2) Model (4) Model (2) Model (4) 
Dep. Var. DISEXP REMFCT DISEXP REMFCT 
Variable Coef. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.068 6.23*** 0.183 3.41*** 0.052 4.52*** 0.093 1.65* 
HHI 0.011 1.98** 0.121 4.33***     
AvgTenure     0.002 6.80*** 0.011 5.90*** 
Accrual 0.027 1.55 0.375 4.38*** 0.134 7.05*** 0.489 5.23*** 
Size 0.004 3.89*** 0.022 4.47*** 0.005 4.72*** 0.025 5.16*** 
Time -0.002 -4.80*** -0.003 -1.50 -0.001 -2.14** 0.001 0.40 
Leverage 0.019 1.98** 0.075 1.55 0.025 2.52** 0.094 1.91* 
SOX 0.009 1.54 0.009 0.33 0.011 1.78* 0.009 0.31 
BIG8 -0.050 -8.09*** -0.158 -5.17*** -0.043 -6.61*** -0.112 -3.51*** 
MTB -0.001 -1.74* -0.004 -1.81* -0.001 -1.66* -0.003 -1.44 
ROA 0.019 1.02 0.110 1.21 0.026 1.36 0.128 1.36 
Litigation -0.107 -29.92*** -0.476 -27.20*** -0.108 -30.31*** -0.484 -27.50*** 
         
N 17,267  17,267  16,575  16,575  
Adj. R2 0.056  0.046  0.064  0.051  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
Appendix 1. Variable Description 
Variable Definition 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, product market competition proxy. The HHI is 
computed as the sum of squares of market shares of firms in an industry 
(based on four-digit SIC codes).   HHI = ∑N si2    
                                                  i=1     
where s is a firm’s net sales (Compustat data 12) 
REMFCT 
CFO 
PROD 
DISEXP 
Real earnings management measure. Following Roychowdhury (2006), I 
measure REM using abnormal cash flow levels, discretionary expense and 
production costs. These three variables are derived from the estimated 
residuals from the following three Roychowdhury (2006) equations:                           
 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0+𝛼1(
1
𝐴𝑡−1
)+𝛽1(
𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2(
∆𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
)+𝜖𝑡                                          
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
=
𝛼0+𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
) +𝛽1 (
𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝜖𝑡                                                          
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0+𝛼1(
1
𝐴𝑡−1
)+𝛽1(
𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) +
𝛽2(
∆𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3(
∆𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝜖𝑡 
 
SIZE Natural logarithm of market value of equity. Market value of equity 
(MKTVE) is defined as Price Close Annual – Fiscal (Data 199 (PRCC_F)) * 
Common Shares Outstanding (Data 25 (CSHO)).  
MTB Market to book ratio. MTB is defined as market value of equity (MKTVE) 
divided by Common/Ordinary Equity – Total (Data 60 (CEQ)). 
ROA Return on assets. ROA is defined as Income before extraordinary items (Data 
18 (IB)) divided by Total assets (Data 6 (AT)). 
SOX An indicator variable that equals 1 for fiscal years 2003 upward and 0 
otherwise. 
AM Nondiscretionary Accruals as a proxy for Accrual management.  
Nondiscretionary Accruals is estimated as follows: 
TAi,t         =  β0           1                +  β1  (ΔREVi,t – ΔRECi,t)    + β2       PPEi,t         
ASSETi,t-1           ASSETi,t-1                                ASSETi,t-1                                    ASSETi,t-1 
 
 Where  
Total Accruals (TA) is difference between income before extraordinary items 
and operating cash flows.  
Change in net revenues (ΔREV) is the revenues in year t minus year t-1.  
PPE is the gross value of Property, Plant and Equipment   
Asset is Total Assets. 
BIG8 A dummy variable that equals 1 for firms audited by a big 8 audit firm and 0 
otherwise. (Data 149 (AU)). 
LITIGATION An indicator variable that equals 1 for firms in the following industries:   
pharmaceutical/biotechnology (SIC codes 2833–2836, 8731–8734), 
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computer (3570–3577, 7370–7374), electronics (3600–3674), or retail 
(5200–5961), and 0 otherwise 
LEVERAGE Leverage is defined as long-term debt (Data 9 (DLTT)) divided by total 
assets (Data 6 (AT)).  
INDMGN Price-Cost Margin, second proxy for product market competition. The Price-
Cost Margin is computed as the industry aggregate sales divided by industry 
aggregate operating costs. INDMGN = Industry Sale (Data 12 (SALE)) 
divided by Industry Operating Costs (Data 41 (COGS) + Data 132 (XSGA) + 
Data 14 (DPACT)). 
AVGTENURE CEO Average Tenure measure, labour market competition proxy. The 
AVGTENURE is computed as the average of the number of years (tenure) 
that CEOs stay in office in each industry (based on a four-digit SIC 
classification). 
AVGTENURE = Industry Yearleave – Industry Firstyear 
                                  No. of CEOs in Industry 
COMPINT Product and Labour market competition interaction variable 
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